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Sciences Po, Paris, France
To Alessia Lefebure
THE POLITICS OF NATURE: NEWAND OLD
Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in ecological issues among
thinkers concerned with cosmopolitics. Here I wish to offer a slightly different
perspective on the politics of ecological issues by adding two lines of reasoning to the
topic: one of them from my original field, science and technology studies, and the
other from what I have called the anthropology of the moderns.
To begin with, speaking about a ‘politics of nature’ might appear simultaneously
strange and obvious, terribly new and terribly old. On the one hand, that ‘nature’ in
relation to ecological issues has become increasingly present in the political agendas
of rich and poor nations is obvious to anyone who cares to read the newspapers. But
nature has also entered the political realm in another and more troublesome sense.
Until recently, we have been in the habit of saying that while politics is about
conflicts, power struggles, ideologies, emotions, inequalities, and the distribution of
resources and wealth, the turn from politics to the natural realm meant a move from
endless conflicts to certainty, from human centered passions to object centered reason.
This is no longer the case. What has happened in the recent past is that issues about
natural entities*tigers conservation, the monopoly over rare earths, dam construc-
tions, the planting of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) cotton, genetics of
race, alternative energy sources, and so on and so forth*no longer play the role of
calming cold reasons, but have become some of the hottest topics of public
controversies. It is as if nature and geopolitics had been conflated. We only have to
think about last year’s climategate or the recent shaky deal in Cancun over non-
binding CO2 reduction to witness a political controversy about a formerly natural
question: that of the climate itself. And yet, what could be further away from political
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arenas than the climate of the Earth? Who would have thought only 20 years ago that
no political scientist could ignore the Earth climate system and all its uncertainties?
Who would have thought that, in addition to constitutions, administrative law, and
economics, he or she should be aware of the chemistry of high atmosphere or of the
precise layering of Arctic ice cores?
However, this is not what is most novel or surprising. Who would have predicted
that in turning one’s attention to such new topics coming from scientific disciplines,
one would have to weigh the relative authority of disputing and disputed scientists?
This is really a novelty. Scientists no longer appear as a voice from nowhere
mysteriously fused with the undisputable necessity of matters of facts. Each of us has
to become aware of different cultures of science, different paradigms, different and
often conflicting claims, instrumentations, research protocols, and field trial designs.
In a strange way, we all have to foreground the complex institutions necessary for
scientific productions. In earlier days, any politically astute commentator would
know how to take into account the complex institutions of parliaments, of
committees, of election, canvassing, campaigning, of corruptions, and media
manipulations. But when he or she had to turn to the results of science*be it
natural or social science*he or she would not have thought it required foreground-
ing the whole complex ecosystem necessary for the resulting fact to be produced.
‘Institution’ was a term used for representing people, not for representing objects and
things. Who needs to take into account institutions when the truth of matters of fact
are concerned? But today every one of us has to become a commentator, a critique, a
judge, just as attuned to the complexity of political institutions as to the complexity of
scientific productions.2
For this reason*the proliferation of scientific controversies, what I have called the
shift from ‘matters of facts’ to ‘matters of concern’*I think it is safe to say that the
politics of nature is a new phenomenon and a rather troublesome one. What I named
‘the parliament of things’ 20 years ago is now almost fully operational, as we saw in
Tokyo, Copenhagen, and more recently in Cancun.3 In such a parliament, there are
representatives who are spokespersons for people, for governments, for special
interests groups, for lobbies, for climate models, ice cores, tiger preservation, genes,
rivers, and soils. As I have shown many times elsewhere, the divide is not between
science and politics but between trusted and not trusted representatives. What is sure
is that the very notion of a representative government, or representative democracy,
now includes the highly complex set up that represents non-humans as well as
humans.
The situation is indeed novel and troubling, both for politicians who can no longer
turn to scientists and experts to stop political controversies once and for all and who
can’t hide anymore behind the hard facts of science to disguise their arbitrary
decisions, and for scientists who are suddenly forced to unveil the complex ecology
that gives authority to their voices (and they have now to defend themselves against
the accusation of being a special interest among others . . . ). There now exists, at least
in dotted lines, a kind of global parliament for non-humans as well as for humans
representing special interests, each representing their constituencies and no one being
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able to claim to represent the general will or the common good once and for all. At
least it is no longer possible to appeal outside this political arena, to nature and its laws
as if it were a higher court and a higher transcendent authority, in order to stop
political disputes and religious conflicts.
Simultaneously, no matter how novel this situation appears to be to us, it is
certainly not the case that we have suddenly moved from a situation where nature
was kept away from politics to a situation where it is now entangled into political
arenas. In a very deep sense, politics has always been about things and matter. It has
always been, to take up again the old and beautiful term rejuvenated by the Belgian
philosopher Isabelle Stengers, a cosmopolitics, by which she means not an appeal to
universality or to life in big metropolis, but a politics of the cosmos.4 Indeed, I think it is
important here to strike the right balance between those two Greek terms: ‘cosmos’ is
what insures that politics will never be just for the benefits of isolated humans, and
‘politics’ is what insures that cosmos is not naturalized and kept totally apart from
what humans do to it.
That politics has always been a cosmopolitics, that it has always been about
landscapes, animal husbandry, forest, water, irrigation, about building cities, the
circulation of air, the management of disease, in brief about cosmic and material
forces, is so obvious in so many traditions that I do not have to belabor the point.
This age-old connection does not need to be religious, it is also largely secular. If it is
one of the beautiful results of Indian civilization to have elaborated extraordinary
complex traditions and rituals around the entanglement of cosmos and good life, it is
also true that a look at Marxist many schools would provide a wealth of the same
linkages that have been established between material and social conditions. What
counts is not if you are religious or secular, but if you manage to protect humans from
being defined without the cosmos that provide their life support, and nature from
being understood without humans that have collaborated with non-humans for
eons.5 Cosmopolitics is another word for materialism, as it were. But as usual the
difficulty is to learn what is meant by the word matter. As we are learning or
relearning very fast through the ecological crisis, it is very hard it seems to be a
materialist for good.
As you may know, ‘cosmos’ in Greek means a disposition, an arrangement, a way to
compose agencies, with the idea of beauty and ornament in addition to that of
materiality. To this day, the trivial word ‘cosmetics’ maintains the value judgment
that always go with the thought of a well-ordered cosmos. To speak of cosmopolitics
is to say that the world has to be composed. To be composed and not to be unveiled,
possessed, mastered, or abandoned for some other world, a world of outer space, of
Pandora’s planet, or a world of beyond, a spiritual realm. I’d like to use the word
composition as an alternative to modernization. Thus, as I will discuss in further detail
later, we could say that the world has to be composed instead of having to be
modernized.
But before we return to that, let me insist on the same point by claiming that while
half of the inhabitants of the Earth have become inhabitants of cities, i.e. city
dwellers, this should not hide the fact that we have all become peasants again. Yes! We
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are relearning to be peasants just at a time when we thought we had migrated to cities
for good. A farmer, a peasant is not only someone who lives in the countryside, he or
she is someone who lives off the land. Think about it: in what sense are we less
dependent of the land than before? My father who was a wine grower was by no
means a peasant, and yet his whole attention was concentrated on the weather, on
the rain, on the dangerous pests, on the earthworms, just as much as on the vagaries
of the world market taste for Burgundy’s fine wines. Similarly, today, we constantly
and more than ever look out for the state of the weather, for the fragility of our
ecosystems, for the coming of monsoons, for the pollution of our air, for the very
stability of our soils, for the height of our seas, for the quality of our vegetables, for
the safety of our soft drinks. To be sure, the scale of the territory has expanded, the
size of our dwellings, the distance between the plot of lands, and our hands and our
mouths, but it would be a great mistake to believe that we by moving from the
countryside to the huge metropolis in fact had migrated from a land to nowhere.
Instead, we have been uprooted from one cosmopolitics to another. Go tell your
representatives in Cancun that they are city dwellers who are now allowed to forget
about air, soil, fire, and water. We are now farmers on Earth’s troubled land, forced
to come ‘down to earth’. Here again, as always, modernization is not a movement
that breaks radically with the past, but rather something that brings the past back
with a vengeance in expanded scale and more entangled complexity. We left behind
our little plot of land and our quiet and often stultifying village life and are now
forced to consider the whole planet all over again. This is why I take the politics of
nature, cosmopolitics, to be simultaneously a new phenomenon that forces everyone
of us to reinvent politics and science in a new combination so as to absorb
controversies about natural issues, and a very old fact of civilization that can be
experienced through the many different traditions that have always rejected the idea
of a human totally detached from her conditions of existence, from her life support,
and from fragile artificial spheres.
In spite of this continuity between various types of politics of nature, some might
still irresistibly feel that nature and politics are two different realms nonetheless. But
why is it that it seems as such a surprise to modernized city dwellers to learn suddenly
that they depend on levels of CO2 for their climate, of planktons for their tuna meals,
on rare earths for their computer ships? As good materialists, we might be surprised
by the new associations in which we find ourselves entangled, but certainly not with
the very fact of being entangled with things. The ecological crisis should come to
us all*I mean us modernized city dwellers*as new avatars of the same old
cosmopolitics, but not as a Revelation or an Apocalypse. So why is it that the
ecological crisis appears to our cultures, not only as novelties but as scandalous
obstacles in the way of our growth and development? Why are we surprised by what
should be obvious: we live on Earth, where else would we reside? Thus, what puzzles
me is how there can exist such a disconnect between, on the one hand, the size of the
threat that is presented to us, and on the other, the laid-back, indolent, blase´ attitude
that so many of us take toward the duties of ‘protecting nature’ or ‘saving creation’.
B. Latour
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The argument I pursue here is that we do not possess the emotional set of attitudes
to cope with this problem. This could be illustrated by comparing with war. Some
say that we are actually at war, i.e. that the present threat is much more severe than
the ‘old wars’, in fact, even more so than the nuclear war that has threatened human
civilization*and still does, by the way*with annihilation. (Lovelock actually uses
the war metaphor to explain why we can’t win against the ‘revenge of Gaia’: if we win
we lose and if we lose against her, well, we lose too!6). And yet, if it were a war, we
would know how to behave, how to define an enemy and a friend, and we would
have the right set of emotions, of thrills, of fears. We would be mobilized, or at least
we would know what it is to be mobilized. We have rehearsed it countless times since
we were infants as if we had lived always in ‘war games’. With the ecological crisis,
however, most of us don’t know what it is to be mobilized, emotionally committed,
fully active firing on the front line, and so on.
Of course, some of us do know, but the problem of the Greens everywhere is that
they seem unable to tap the right sources of energy and strike the right chord of the
multitude. If we are so threatened, why is it that ecologically minded people
constitute no more than a minority? I think most would agree that there is no
comparison between the urgency of ecological concerns and the mobilizing energy of
wars or, for that matter, religion. A threat to a temple? A blasphemy somewhere?
Everyone is up in arms. Millions move like one single man. A threat to the Earth life
system? A yawn, or a slow snail-like move to change our light bulbs. This is what
I call the disconnect. How is it that we remain dumbfounded by the ecological crisis?
Some of us are tempted by a retreat through ‘degrowth’ (de´croissance), others claim
that only religion can save us, still to others more technology is the only solution. And
while all of those positions are entertained in rich nations and wealthy suburbs, the
large part of the world’s population is still clamoring for decent housing and clean
water, emancipation, growth, and development. Indeed, two claims are simulta-
neously true: there is a threat to the human life support at the same time as several
billions of fellow humans have to be lifted out of poverty.
It is fair to say that modernization has not prepared us especially well to the impact
of the ecological crisis. Rather, it seems as if the modernizing urge has made the
modernized unable to prepare themselves for the necessary changes in the scale of
their cosmopolitics. Instead of preparing themselves, they entirely forgot they would
have to equip themselves emotionally, institutionally, and legally for the tasks of a
politics of nature. In fact, to put it more bluntly, it was not only a lack of preparation,
a sort of indolence, but an active denial that such preoccupation should even take
place. ‘Emancipation’ for the modernizing activists meant that it was not only
unnecessary but even reactionary to even think about the short- or long-term nature
of our anthropic life support. In the powerful terms of the great German philosopher
Peter Sloterdijk, humans were supposed to have moved ‘outside’, freed themselves
from any attachment, and not to remain ‘inside’ any sphere of existence. This is what
was meant by ‘emancipation’: to modernize was to move ‘out of ’ old dwellings never
to come back ‘into’ a new more fragile, complex dwelling.7 Those who were resisting
Politics of nature: East and West perspectives
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modernization*and they were many, left and right, poor and rich*were always
taken as a rearguard slowing down the inevitable frontier of progress.
Thismeans that some caution is called forwhenusing theword ‘progress’. Thisword
does not necessarily mean that anyone progress ‘forward’, or looks ahead with eyes
wide opened and careful precaution. Progress might also be blind, thus moving with
eyes wide shut. In fact, I believe that the great paradox of the two centuries variously
described in terms of industrial revolutions, capitalism, mechanization, or globaliza-
tion is that while they were in effect rendering through each new innovation evenmore
necessary a politics of nature, the net result was exactly the opposite; that is, the
constant delaying and indefinite forgetting of the day of reckoning where emancipation
would have to pay its full prize of entanglement. Instead of preparing for Gaia and
taking her as the necessary consequence of our expanding energy, ingenuity,
technology, and our own expanding numbers, we suddenly startled as if Gaia was
suddenly irrupting as a total surprise and in our back! I have been very interested lately
in this strange configuration that makes ecological concerns appear at the back of
modernizers. Were they not supposed to be turned toward the future? Forward!
Forward! Is this not in the name of this ‘plus ultra, plus ultra’ that Europeans havemoved
through and across the world? But if this were true, if they were really facing forward,
then they should have met the consequences of their entanglements face on instead of
waiting until the last 10 or 20 years to realize suddenly that they lived on planet Earth.
Hence, my suspicion is that the modernizers are not turned toward the future as
I thought they were, and as the old cliche´ of ‘hubris’ has made us believe. They are
more interesting than that. It is not hubris that makes them move but the escape
from the past, a past to which they are totally fixated because they remain constantly
terrified by being archaic, attached, and dependent. Indeed, this would explain why
they keep living in utopia, viz. thinking of growth and development without attachment
and entanglement, a dream of living in no man’s land. No wonder. If you think of it, it
is completely impossible for someone who flees his or her past in horror*fleeing
backward, that is*to simultaneously look behind the back for what is coming next, to
prepare oneself for what is coming ahead. In my view, the moderns’ state of confusion
in facing the ecological crisis, the lack of any full-blown politics of nature, proves that
they have been the least future-centered of all people.8 Had they looked ahead, they
would have seen what was comingmuch earlier. This is also whymodernizers are such
bad indicators when the time has come to distinguish who is reactionary from who is
progressive, who is archaic from who is modern, and what is moving backward from
what is moving forward. Don’t ask directions from people fleeing backward to escape a
horrible past while not noticing where they are heading and what is coming at them
from behind. Don’t ask directions from people twice terrified!
EAST AND WEST PERSPECTIVES
In light of this, one might argue that ‘we have never been modern’, which brings me
to the topic of the subtitle, which states ‘East and West perspectives’, as if there was
B. Latour
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an East and a West! Be reassured, I am not going to indulge into exoticism. I will not
oppose ‘Western secular materialism’ with ‘Eastern wisdom’, nor contrast ‘Cartesian
dualism’ with ‘Asian spirituality’. No, as an anthropologist I have always been
interested in combating all exoticisms, and especially the one that has fell so hard
on my European compatriots, namely Occidentalism. The ravages of Orientalism have
struck very hard due to the difficulty of describing the so-called West without
attributing to it virtues and vices it never had. In fact, the first exoticism was about
the West*what they believed they were doing*and has only after struck on the
‘others’. Hence, Orientalism is in a way the exportation of Occidentalism.
So the first task for anyone engaging in the risky enterprise of comparing East and
West perspectives is to not mess up the standard that is chosen as the baseline for the
comparison. Unfortunately, the problem is that almost everyone has messed up
the definition of the West by taking it as its face value, taking up its own Master
Narrative about having been modern; a narrative suggesting that the West was the
place where a ‘scientific revolution’ had occurred in such a way as to reveal the
universal necessity of nature. It is my contention that this is the source of exoticism
that would render impossible any cosmopolitics. I know I am treading on dangerous
ground here and that the ugly head of ‘relativism’ might make you flee in panic. But
bear with me a while longer.
This anti-Occidentalist argument is not a critique of science nor a flight from
reason, but only an antidote against exoticism. It merely suggests that it is necessary
to redescribe science and technology as they have been developing in the last three
centuries without cutting them from the rich matrix in which they have grown. The
reason why I am proud of my little domain of science and technology studies, is
because it has provided the first antidote to Occidentalism by offering a redescription
of science, reason, nature, and matter, which is just as far from celebration as it is
from critique. It offers a view of science in action, freed from the vices and virtues
that makes it impossible to compare with other modes of existence. From the Greek
practice of demonstration*I am thinking here of Reviel Netz’s fabulous book9*to
nanotechnologists’ manipulation of image*think of Lorraine Daston’s and Peter
Galison’s recent book on Objectivity10*through so many revisions of major
historical figures*such as Simon Schaffer’s Newton,11 Mario Biagioli’s Galileo,12
or my own Pasteur*a completely different narrative of what has happened under the
name of the scientific revolution has revealed itself. None of those episodes is
clarified, explained, simplified, or understood by saying that a modernist spirit has
finally emerged out of its archaic premodern past. Of course, there has been many
dramatic changes in cosmopolitics, such as a formidable amplification of the number
of non-humans to take into account, and an amazing deepening in the intimacy of
the connections between humans and non-humans. But these changes never meant
an escape from cosmopolitics itself. Because where could this possibly be an escape
to? To nature? To modernity? To emancipation?
This is not the place to review those changes, but let me make a few remarks.
While the modernist narrative implied a move from the old archaic cosmos to the
infinite universe (to use Alexandre Koyre´’s title),13 the alternative narrative that
Politics of nature: East and West perspectives
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I propose as an antidote to Occidentalism implies a move from a finite cosmos to
another vastly enlarged but still finite cosmos. That is, from one politics of nature to
another one. However, that we have moved from one set of finitudes to another
doesn’t mean that we are limited, since new sets of possibilities open, which require a
very different set of attitudes regarding science and technology in order to adjust to
this new (that is, old) finite cosmos.
It might be objected that it doesn’t seem to make much difference which narrative
we hold on to here. Indeed, I am well aware that these changes have been made
explicit through the work of experts in history, sociology of science, and technology,
which could seem to have no relevance at all except for specialists. And yet the first
thing this revision of Occidentalism does is to pry open all the questions of West!East
comparisons. By totally changing the baseline (e.g. the West does not consist in a
modernizing front that could be defined by the naturalization of cultural traits), we
get a different shibboleth, a different compass, which allows us to reopen all the
questions of ‘comparative’ or what I have called ‘symmetric’ anthropology without
having to lose ourselves in the vague reveries of Occidentalism. Such a shift in
outlook would come handy just at the time when the ecological crisis strikes
indifferently East, West, North, and South, and when former ‘East’ is now made of
powerful nations that makes it increasingly difficult to fasten the old veils of
Orientalism. What is the use of speaking of East and West at a time when ‘BRIC’ has
become the name of a new power block? Now that the geopolitical playing field is less
unequal, it might be time to abandon exoticism for good, since something entirely
different from modernization has occurred. If ‘we’*the former inhabitants of the
former West*have never been modern, what has happened to them and to all of us?
Certainly a very different story than that of being a divided soul between archaic and
progressive tendencies.
There is also a more philosophical gain to be made by this change of baseline for
East/West comparisons. The results of the little field of science and technology study
are now resonating in extraordinary and unexpected ways with the politics of nature
that we have to address. The key opportunity, as I see it, is that we are finally in a
position to free the practice of science from the narrow constrains imposed on it by
‘naturalism’. Indeed, this takes us back to the introductory note about the contrast
between nature and controversies about natural entities, matters of fact and matters of
concern, modernization and composition, to which I said I would return. To put it
bluntly: ‘naturalism’ is not the only way to harvest the benefits of science and
technology. Naturalism does not describe the way nature functions, but actually
deeply transforms*not to say pervert*the practices of science into something
entirely different: a world into which things have become objects (Gegenstand to use
the German term). This is a point that is difficult to make within the present limited
space since it could easily be confused with a critique of reductionism or even with an
attack on objectivity and realism. But the point is precisely the opposite: a realist
description of scientific practice would have to retain everything we care for in the
urge for science but will not prematurely unify all its results as if the objects of science
all resided in what my compatriot Descartes had called the res extensa.
B. Latour
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In other words, naturalism is the premature unification of scientific laboratory
practices into one continuous domain, or to use philosophical terms: a world made of
Galilean objects moving into Euclidian space. The results of scientific inquiries are
always located inside their life support; limited to a complex set of visualizing
techniques; dependent on the know how of small numbers of specialists; linked to
narrowly defined and slowly moving paradigms; extraordinarily sensitive to shifts in
funding, ideology, and industry. To put it briefly, while any mechanism, any
automatism in order to survive requires a subtle legal and human ecosystem, and
science and technology are always supported by complex institutions and mixed in
endless ways to the rest of politics, naturalism is the operation that stitches together
some of the uprooted results and expand them into a realm of undisputable
necessities producing long chains of causes and effects.
This argument is toxic if you take it as a critique of scientific objectivity or as a
cliche´ about never ‘forgetting’ that humans cannot be treated as mere objects. But
what I wish to say is something different, namely, that objects themselves, I mean
non-humans, should not be treated as mere objects either. Matters of concern should
not be degraded into matters of fact. The reason why people find it difficult to be a
materialist is that we have confused matter with a highly idealistic definition of what
it is; hence, the unrealistic realism that passes for a hard boiled scientific outlook and
which is often nothing more, as I have shown elsewhere, than the confusion between
res extensa and the drawings of objects on computer screens. The reason why the
multiverse has been flattened or squashed into a universe is because, as Whitehead
said, the process to know, to draw, and to visualize things has been confused with the
‘passage of nature’ itself.14
A world made of matters of concern is infinitely more realist, more objective, and
more recalcitrant than an outside world made of matters of fact. For sure, the spurious
continuity allowed by the illusion of a res extensa offered a quick fix to the crucial
political questions of agreement and universality. Undisputable matters of fact
seemed to offer a way out of all of our disputes by unifying the world once and for all.
But it was making the world common much too rapidly instead of progressively
composing the common world. As the adjective indicates the world has to be made
‘common’, which is something that cannot be made fast and on the cheap. This is
not a ‘relativist’ point against universality, it simply says that universality is at the end
not at the beginning of a slow and difficult process of composition that cannot take
place without establishing relations among all the entities that participate in the
pluriverse.
To return to the politics of nature, I insist on contrasting naturalism with
compositionism because of a very important feature of controversies over ecological
entities. They are not visible without the mediation of scientific disciplines. If the
problems of the public, as John Dewey said, is to visualize through inquiries the
unintended consequences of our action, it is extraordinary difficult to produce a
‘public’ concerned with ecological problems because of the enormous complexity,
the long distance between causes and consequences, the lag time, the rupture in
scale, and the erasure of national and administrative boundaries.15 At every step,
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in order to visualize the consequences, we need to go through some laboratories to
learn new techniques, to be confident in the results of some instruments, and to
appeal to some experts. The very extension of science and technology to the whole
fabric of our existence does not prove that we are now finally moderns. Quite the
opposite: we have now mixed humans and non-humans to such a degree that
we need a completely new cosmopolitics to create the feedback loops that would
allow us to feel the consequences of our actions and build a collective public; that is,
to collect the public out of a confusing set of issues.
NOTES
1. This paper was originally delivered as a lecture at the University of New Delhi the 6th of
January 2011 under the auspices of the European Cooperation Program and at the invitation
of Professor Thaphan and Gilles Vernier.
2. James Hoggan, Climate cover-up. The crusade to deny global warming (Vancouver: Greystone
Books, 2009); Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of doubt: How a handful of
scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming (London: Bloomsbury
Press, 2010).
3. Bruno Latour, We have never been modern, trans. Cathy Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1993).
4. Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics I, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2010).
5. Amita Baviskar, ed., Contested grounds: Essays on nature, culture, and power (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007).
6. James Lovelock, The revenge of Gaia: Earth’s climate crisis and the fate of humanity (New York:
Basic Books, 2006).
7. Peter Sloterdijk, Neither sun nor death. A dialog with Hans-Jrgen Heinrichs, trans. Steve
Corcoran (Los Angeles: Semiotexts, 2010).
8. Bruno Latour, ‘Steps Toward the Writing of a Compositionist Manifesto’, New Literary
History 41 (2010): 471!90.
9. Reviel Netz, The shaping of deduction in Greek mathematics: A study in cognitive history
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
10. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2007).
11. Simon Schaffer, The information order of Isaac Newton’s principia mathematica (Upsalla: Salvia
Smaskrifter, 2008).
12. Mario Biagioli, Galileo’s instruments of credit: Telescopes, images, secrecy (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2006).
13. Alexandre Koyre´, From the closed-world to the infinite universe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1957).
14. Alfred North Whitehead, Concept of nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920).
15. John Dewey, The public and its problems (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1927, 1954).
B. Latour
10
(page number not for citation purpose)
